



November 2011  
Volume 17 - Issue 11

# The Monthly Newsletter, Perch Base, USSVI Phoenix, Arizona

[WWW.PERCH-BASE.ORG](http://WWW.PERCH-BASE.ORG)



## Featured Story

### Torpedoes in World War II

Part 2 of 2 parts

## USSVI CREED

Our organization's purpose is . . .

"To perpetuate the memory of our shipmates who gave their lives in the pursuit of their duties while serving their country. That their dedication, deeds and supreme sacrifice be a constant source of motivation toward greater accomplishments. Pledge loyalty and patriotism to the United States of America and its Constitution.

In addition to perpetuating the memory of departed shipmates, we shall provide a way for all Submariners to gather for the mutual benefit and enjoyment. Our common heritage as Submariners shall be strengthened by camaraderie. We support a strong U.S. Submarine Force.

The organization will engage in various projects and deeds that will bring about the perpetual remembrance of those shipmates who have given the supreme sacrifice. The organization will also endeavor to educate all third parties it comes in contact with about the services our submarine brothers performed and how their sacrifices made possible the freedom and lifestyle we enjoy today."



## 2011 Perch Base Foundation Supporters

These are the Base members and friends who donate monies to allow for Base operation while keeping our dues low and avoid raising money through member labor as most other organizations do.

**Remember, if you contribute by check, it must be made out to the "Perch Base Foundation."**

## These are the 2011 Foundation Donors



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ED WOLF  
JOHN G. ZAICHKIN  
RONALD J. ZOMOK

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## Sailing Orders



### **NO NOVEMBER MEETING**

Next regular meeting will be December 10  
12 noon (social hour at 11 a.m.)  
Dillon's Restaurant at Arrowhead  
20585 N. 59th Avenue  
Glendale, AZ 85308-6821

**All of the following events will  
be updated and details verified  
by *Flash Traffic* messages.**

November 5

Veterans Historical Project  
(Static Display)  
10 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Tempe Historical Society Museum  
809 E. Southern Avenue  
Tempe, AZ 85282

November 9

Higley High School (Static Display)  
(on) Williams Field  
2076 S. Higley Rd.  
Gilbert, AZ 85295

November 11

Gilbert Town Hall (Static Display)

November 11

Phoenix Veterans Day Parade  
(watch for a separate *Flash Traffic* with  
details.)

# LEST WE FORGET THOSE STILL ON PATROL

## NOVEMBER ETERNAL PATROLS

### Lost Harbor

by Leslie Nelson Jennings

There is a port of no return, where ships  
May ride at anchor for a little space  
And then, some starless night, the cable slips,  
Leaving an eddy at the mooring place . . .  
Gulls, veer no longer. Sailor, rest your oar.  
No tangled wreckage will be washed ashore.




**Nov. 7, 1944 USS Albacore (SS-218)**  
**85 men lost**

*Albacore* left Pearl Harbor on 24 October 1944, topped off her fuel tanks at Midway Island on 28 October, and was never heard from again. According to Japanese records captured after the war, a submarine (presumed to be *Albacore*) struck a naval mine very close to the shore off north-eastern Hokkaidō on 7 November 1944. A Japanese patrol boat witnessed the explosion of a submerged submarine and

saw a great deal of heavy oil, cork, bedding, and food supplies rise to the surface. On 21 December, *Albacore* was presumed lost. Her name was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register on 30 March 1945.

**Nov. 8, 1944 USS Growler (SS-215)**  
**86 men lost**

Growler's 11th and final war patrol began out of Fremantle on 20 October 1944 in a wolf pack with Hake (SS-256) and Hardhead (SS-365). On 8 November the wolf pack, again headed by Growler, closed a convoy for attack, with Growler on the opposite side of the enemy from Hake and Hardhead. The order to commence attacking was the last communication ever received from Growler. After the attack was underway, Hake and Hardhead heard what sounded like a torpedo explosion and then a series of depth charges on Growler's side of the convoy, and then nothing. Although officially unknown, she possibly was sunk by one of her own torpedoes, but it is probable that the convoy's escorts sank her.




**Nov. 9, 1944 USS Scamp (SS-277)**  
**83 men lost**

On 14 November, Scamp was ordered to take up the life guard station off Tokyo Bay in support of B-29 Superfortress bomber strikes, but failed to acknowledge the mes-

sage. *Scamp* was never heard from again. From records available after the war, it appears that *Scamp* was sighted by Japanese planes and reported depth charged by a destroyer to the south of Tokyo Bay on 11 November 1944.

**Nov. 16, 1943      USS Corvina      (SS-226)  
82 men lost**

Corvina put out from Pearl Harbor on her maiden war patrol 4 November, topped off her fuel tanks at Johnston Island two days later, and was never heard from again. Japanese records report that Japanese submarine I-176 launched three torpedoes at an enemy submarine south of Truk (her patrol area) 16 November, claiming two hits which resulted in the explosion of the target. If this was Corvina, she was the only American submarine to be sunk by a Japanese submarine in the entire war. Her loss with her crew of 82 was announced 14 March 1944



**Nov. 19, 1943      USS Sculpin      (SS-191)  
63 men lost**

The account of Sculpin's final patrol was given by the surviving members of her crew, who were liberated from Japanese prisoner of war camps after V-J Day. She has been forced into a surface action from depth charging and eventually scuttled. Survivors were picked up and ultimately 21 survived as POWs.

**Nov. 23, 1943      USS Capelin      (SS-289)  
76 men lost**

Japanese records studied after the war listed an attack on a supposed United States submarine on 23 November, off Kaoe Bay, Halmahera. Evidence of an actual contact was slight, and the Japanese state that this attack was broken off. Enemy minefields are now known to have been placed in various positions along the north coast of Sulawesi (Celebes) in Capelin's area, and she may have been lost because of a mine explosion. Gone without a trace, with all her crew, Capelin remains in the list of ships lost without a known cause.




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## From the Wardroom Base Commander's Message

Shipmates:

Our first event will be history by the time you read this: the ASU Homecoming on October 29. The following week we will support the Veterans History Project in Tempe on November 5. Then the beginning of all the Veterans Day events. Check your **Flash Traffic** and the schedule on our website. If you are going to participate, please make your desires known. Contact our event coordinator and let him know.

There will be NO meeting in November. We have two events on that day so it'll be quite hectic.

Our past Base Commander, Stan Reinhold, continues to improve at the Barrow Neurological Rehab Facility. He would appreciate visits from shipmates. Check your Flash Traffic for details.

See you at our upcoming events.

Fraternally,

Jim Denzien, Base Commander

## October 2011 Minutes of the Regular Base Meeting

The regular monthly meeting of the Arizona Submarine Veterans Perch Base was convened at Dillon's **Restaurant at Arrowhead, in Glendale, AZ at 12:00 hours, 8 October, 2011. The meeting was called to order** by Jim Denzien, Base Commander.

The "Call to Order" was followed by a prayer of invocation by Walt Blomgren, the Pledge of Allegiance and the reciting of our Creed. The tolling ceremony was conducted for all boats lost in the month of October and a moment of silence was observed for our shipmates on eternal patrol and our recently lost shipmate Dick Caraker, "Sailor rest your oars".

Jim Denzien introduced the guests present at today's meeting. Among others, Nate Baxter presented his dad, Rick Baxter.

According to the Sailing List there were 28 members and guests present. The complete sailing list included:

Jim Denzien	Bob Warner	Chuck Emmett	Rick Simmons
Walt Blomgren	Richard Kunze	John Schlag	Heather Diaz
Peter Tardiff	Don DeMarte	Richard Bernier	Theodore W Hunt
Dan Moss	Thomas Farley	Robert Gilmore	Don Unser
Ed Hawkins	Davy Jones	Dewey Reed	Dottie Reed
Douglas La Rock	Rick Baxter	Roger Miller	Ronald Beyer
William Tippett	Jim W Newman	Jim F Newman	Royce Pettit

The minutes from the October 2011 regular meeting needed to be approved as published in a "Flash Traffic". A motion was made and seconded. The motion was carried by unanimous voice vote.

Bob Warner reported on the base's financial status as of 30 September 2011. A motion was made and seconded to accept the Treasurer's Report as read. The motion carried by unanimous voice vote.

### **Base Commander's Board of Directors Meeting Report**

Jim reported on the Board of Directors meeting held Wednesday October 5<sup>th</sup>.

Float Maintenance – Painting was completed Saturday 17 September and we are adding a new mast, a whip antenna. The new graphic decals were applied on September 18 including the new outlines of the torpedo shutter doors amid ship on both port and starboard also the ejection pump opening by Jim and Howard at Goodyear Self Storage. The facility is located on Litchfield Rd across from Goodyear Airport. Thanks to all that came out and supported us. Jim and Dan Moss are working on an ongoing project to be able to display scale models of the two pieces of armament carried by Phoenix: the Mk 48 Torpedo and Tomahawk cruise missile. This will help show to show what Phoenix was capable of doing.

Boat sponsorship – Perch Base will be providing copies of American Submariner to four submarine crews. The boats were determined as most in need by Jack Messersmith our District 1 Commander, who oversees the Boat Sponsor-

ship Program for USSVI. We will sponsor the USS Tucson (SSN-770,) USS Santa Fe (SSN-763,) USS Albuquerque (SSN-706,) and USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735.) Blue Crew.

Jim said that our application for the Unified Arizona Veterans Group has been approved. The only thing that remains is to pay our dues. This organization includes all veterans groups in the State of Arizona. It encompasses 600,000 veterans of one form or another in the state of Arizona.

Kap(SS)- 4-Kid(SS) –We are still looking for someone to be the coordinator for this program. It is not a lot of work. We visit twice a year and in the past, we have used Children's Hospital. There are other hospitals in the area that have children in similar circumstances. They are not all terminal but may have a long term illness centers. This program provides a good way to cheer them up.

Base Newsletter – Perch Base came in 2<sup>nd</sup> place for our newsletter at the National Convention, which is a fantastic thing. For that, a "BZ" to Chuck Emmett our Communications Officer. One of the things that came from that was in Tar Heel Base's Newsletter. We learned that USSVI National now has insurance for District Commanders and Base Officers. We are yet to determine what that means. We have not had any communication from the National Office. We will pursue getting this information but it's reasonable to assume that it is liability insurance. The Board will report back once we determine what this insurance actually is.

Upcoming Events – One thing that is not yet listed is that next year the State of Arizona celebrates its centennial and that will be on February 14<sup>th</sup> 2012. We have been asked to participate in several of the centennial celebration events. We will be putting out more information as it becomes available. For historical reference there were three territorial capitals of Arizona. Prescott, Tucson and Phoenix. Prescott has already had its celebration. Tucson's celebration will most likely be in January. Phoenix's will be in February.

### **Base Officers and Board of Directors Reports**

**Vice Commander** – Howard Doyle was not present. He was back in Kansas for a family death. Our prayers and wishes are with him.

**Membership Chairman** – Rick Simmons reminded everyone that annual membership dues for 2012 are now due. They must be paid and recorded by 31 December. Once again we will have an early bird drawing for those paying prior to October 31st at the January Awards Dinner. The winner gets free base dues for 2013. If you haven't received the letter contact Rick or send him an e-mail.

**Secretary** – John Schlag had nothing to report.

**Communications Officer** – Chuck Emmett reminded everyone that he has copies of the "MidWatch" with him for anyone not receiving it by e-mail. Also we will see changes in the November newsletter. Let him know what you think of the changes. Chuck also mentioned what he called a near miss on copying web material for inclusion in the newsletter. Someone didn't like that Chuck had used information from his webpage, so Chuck removed it from the previously issued newsletter.

**Tumblers** – The Base has obtained two sizes for sale to all. These are insulated tumblers which include both lids and straws. We have priced them at local stores for \$19 without the lid or straws. Our tumblers include a base patch which was placed inside, whereas the others have decals on the outside. The tumblers are dishwasher safe and are guaranteed for life. The large one is \$18 and the small one is \$14.

**Chief of the Boat** – Richard Kunze has the \$25 Home Depot Gift card which is being raffled off today.

**Chaplain** – Walt Blomgren reported that earlier this week we participated in a cemetery ceremony for WWII vet Dick Caraker who departed on Eternal Patrol. We attended church services and went to the National Cemetery. Both were very nice.

Stan Reinhold was involved in a head-on vehicle collision, breaking the vertebrae in his back. He is now in Health South located about two blocks south of Thunderbird on the west side of the street at 13460 67<sup>th</sup> Ave in room 201. Stop by and visit.

Walt just learned that Sandy Martin is in Del Webb, will get more information on that.

Davy Jones goes into hospital Tuesday. No one else is on the Binnacle list.

**Treasurer** – Bob Warner had nothing additional to report.

**Base Storekeeper** – DeWayne Lober is supporting the base at the Glendale Safety Days and was not present

**Event Coordinator** – Joe Varese is also supporting the base at Glendale Safety Days event. In his place, Jim Denzien reported coming events - Oct 14<sup>th</sup> Glendale High School 100<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Parade/Static Display. This is

considered a centennial event. There is a Naval ROTC Unit at the High School. It will stage at 12 Noon with Parade starting at 13:00. Oct 29<sup>th</sup> we have a static display at ASU; there is a ROTC Unit there.

On Nov 5<sup>th</sup> is the Veterans History Project Static Display at the Tempe Historical Society museum. Starting the 9<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> of November are the Higley High School event we will have a Static Display. This event has been growing every year and is on the football field. On Nov 10<sup>th</sup> at Gilbert Town Hall complex we have a Static Display.

On Nov 11<sup>th</sup> is the Phoenix Veterans Day Parade. This year we will be with the Palo Verde group and they decided they will provide T-Shirts with the parade theme. We will be meeting at Market T Hance Park as we have always done. There will be more information put out on this later. Palo Verde is providing the Grand Marshal so we will not be in the parade with them, but we will do everything else with them including the food at Market T Hance.

On Nov 12<sup>th</sup> is the Daisy Mountain Parade at Anthem in the morning and in the afternoon Black Canyon City Parade for Veterans Day sponsored by The VFW. We've been requested for the Levee Parade, we've been there before, Also received a request for the Parade Del Sol Parade on Feb 11th. Some of this is being held pending decisions the base feels that other than Veterans Day Events, that it is better to participate in Arizona Centennial Events.

Our Awards Banquet will be held on 28 January here at Dillions. We will be conducting the Holland Club induction for 2012. Over the next three years we have a lot of our members being inducted into the Holland Club. More information to follow.

All Events are posted on the Bases Web Page in the Calendar and Chuck will be sending out Flash Traffic.

### **Old Business**

We have been looking at using a trailer as a people carrier for parades.

This was followed by a short discussion about having liability coverage added to individual homeowners insurance for a minimal low cost, To cover the unlikely event that an accident would occur at a parade or static display.

All other items have been covered by prior discussion.

### **New Business**

Davy Jones mentioned the up coming elections and how the candidates may feel in regard to things like the Save our Sail Project. Jim replied that we were drafting a letter to NavC PMS 392 requesting a formal gifting of the Sail, Fairwater Planes and Rudder to the Project. We are also looking at a memorandum of agreement with the city. There are several members of the base including Dan and Layne Moss who are co-chairs of that project. To answer the question the only one known to Jim is Greg Stanton a former city council member was one of the few that came out and said he was in favor of the project. He knew nothing of the others. We are waiting until after the election and the new city council being in place in January.

### **Good of the Order**

We have already covered the Binnacle List.

Info Jim received from Unified Arizona Veterans (UAV) stated that Courtesy Chevrolet offers free oil changes to veterans and active military every Friday. Location 24<sup>th</sup> St and Camelback Rd.

Also from UAV the National Personal Records Center has a new location. We will check and make information available either thru the newsletter or by Flash Traffic.

### **50/50 Drawing**

COB, Richard Kunze conducted the drawing for the Home Depot gift card \$25 value won by Nate's Dad, Rick Baxter. 50/50 drawing. It was won by John Schlag. Total \$109 = \$54 to the Base, John Rec'd \$55.

### **Adjournment**

The benediction was offered by Walt Blomgren.

All outstanding business having been concluded, it was moved and seconded that the meeting be adjourned. The motion carried by unanimous voice vote and the meeting was adjourned.

John Schlag

Secretary, Perch Base USSVI





# NATIONAL USSVI NEWS

## NEWS-01: Call for Nominations for 2012 National and Region Elections

Submitted by: Pat Householder - Nominations Chair on 10/20/2011

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In accordance with the requirement of our Constitution & Bylaws, this is a call for 2012 National Election nominations for the following offices.

**National Commander, National Senior Vice Commander, National Junior Vice Commander, National Secretary, National Treasurer, NE Region Director, SE Region Director, Central Region Director, Western Region Director.**

**The nominations for the Region Director positions are included for convenience in this procedure.**

Any member in good standing may nominate any other member in good standing for any elected National Office, provided that the Nominee's qualification for National Office shall be in accordance with Constitution Article XI Section 1 paragraph (b) and the nomination is accompanied by a letter from the Nominee indicating his willingness to accept the nomination and willingness to serve if elected.

The prerequisite for National Office is that a Nominee must be a Regular Member in good standing a minimum of thirty consecutive months.

- a. Nominees for Senior and Junior Vice-Commander must have completed at least two years as a Member of the Board of Directors. (This includes all District Commanders, past and present, who have met the two years in office requirement.)
- b. Nominees for National Commander must have completed at least two years as a voting member of the Board of Directors by the time they take office as National Commander (NC). (This includes all National Officers and the District Commander of the Year, past and present, who have met the two years as a voting member of the board requirement.)

The term of office for all National officers will be two years or until a successor is elected.

Your nomination must be received by Patrick Householder, Nomination Committee Chair on or by April 30th 2012 by e-mail at [householderp@comcast.net](mailto:householderp@comcast.net) or by mail at 25003 SE 146th St., Issaquah WA 98027.

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## NEWS-02: Duties of the Region Director

Submitted by: Pat Householder on 10/20/2011

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The duties of the Regional Directors shall include but not be limited to:

- a. Be directly responsible to the National Commander for the conduct of organizational business within their Region.
  - b. Serve as members of the Board of Directors.
  - c. Serve as members of the Scholarship Committee.
  - d. Perform other such duties as required by the National Constitution and these Bylaws.
  - e. Work up, keep current, and pass on immediately to his relief a "Turn Over" folder, including all official correspondence, records, and official material assigned to his care.
- 

## NEWS-03: Duties of the National Treasurer

The duties of the National Treasurer shall include, but not be limited to:

- a. Serve as a member of the Board of Directors.
- b. Serve as a member of the Ways and Means Committee.
- c. Be the Chief Financial Officer of the organization.
- d. Be the custodian of all financial records of the organization.
- e. Receive and be responsible for the collection of all moneys due and payable to the organization.
- f. Have custody of all organization funds, and shall provide for their safekeeping, retention, disbursement, and investment in a manner acceptable to the Board of Directors.
- g. Make such reports and returns as are required by Federal, State and Local governments, The Articles of Incorporation, The Constitution, and these Bylaws, including the disbursement of appropriate taxes and fees.
- h. Maintain accounts appropriate to the structure and activities of the organization and in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
- i. Upon election to the position as National Treasurer, the Treasurer-Elect within 15 days and prior to becoming custodian of the organizations funds shall apply for a personal bond in the amount to be determined at the newly elected Board of Directors meeting held subsequent to the Annual Business Meeting. All costs involved in securing the required personal bond shall be borne by the organization. The outgoing Treasurer shall be responsible to ensure that the present bond has been executed and that the organization is fully protected prior to transferring any funds to the new Treasurer. An incumbent Treasurer shall be required to comply with this requirement.
- j. Work up, keep current, and pass on immediately to his relief a "Turn Over" folder, including all official correspondence, records, and official material assigned to his care.

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#### **NEWS-04: The duties of the National Secretary**

The duties of the National Secretary shall include, but not be limited to:

- a. Officiate when required in U.S. Submarine Veterans matters in the absence of the National Commander, National Senior Vice-Commander, and the National Junior Vice-Commander.
- b. Serve as a member of the Board of Directors.
- c. Serve as a member of the Membership Committee, updating membership changes as reported by the Junior Vice-Commander on a quarterly basis. Maintain permanent membership data for the current and past year and be responsible for transfer of all other membership data to the USSVI Archives office.
- d. Be the clerk of the organization and keeper of the seal and affix such seal as required.
- e. Be the custodian of all non-financial records and materials, which shall remain U.S. Submarine Veterans property.
- f. Keep permanent records as required by the Articles of Corporation, the National Constitution, and these Bylaws.
- g. Keep permanent records of the proceedings of all National meetings of the Board of Directors.
- h. Prepare and distribute the National Ballot.
- i. Insure that only members in good standing vote on organizational business.
- j. Serve as the official organization correspondent, forwarding to officers and committee chairman such correspondence as may be appropriate to the performance of their duties
- k. Issue a call to all Committee Chairmen for a report of unfinished issues and have these reports published

in the fourth quarter issue of the American Submariner.

- I. The National Secretary shall issue a new Base Charter once he has received the following Documents and requested items:
  1. The Name of the New Base and date of the first base meeting
  2. A copy of the list of Elected Base officers and Base members.
  3. A copy of the completed District Commander's check off Sheet.
  4. A copy of the approved new Base Bylaws
  5. Work up, keep current and pass on, immediately to his relief a "Turn Over" folder, including all official correspondence, records, and official materials assigned to his care.

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### **NEWS-05: Duties of the National Junior Vice Commander**

Submitted by: Pat Householder on 10/20/2011

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The duties of the Junior Vice-Commander shall include, but not be limited to:

- a. Execute the powers and authority in organization matters, when required, in the absence of the National Commander and National Senior Vice-Commander.
- b. Serve as a member of the Board of Directors.
- c. Act as Chairman of the Membership Committee and maintain an accurate and permanent roll of members and provide membership cards to members in good standing. The Chairman will provide a membership report on a quarterly basis to the National Secretary (NatSec). The report shall be prepared and transmitted to the Nat Sec no later than 15 days following the end of the calendar quarter.
- d. Serve on the Ways and Means Committee.
- e. Be Responsible for the direction and control of the National Office
- f. Prepare and present an annual report relative to the operation of his office at the Annual Business Meeting.
- g. Work up, keep current, and pass on immediately to his relief a "Turn Over" folder, including all official correspondence, records, and official materials assigned to his care.

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### **NEWS-06: Duties of the National Senior Vice Commander**

Submitted by: Pat Householder on 10/20/2011

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The duties of the Senior Vice-Commander shall include, but not be limited to:

- a. Assist the National Commander in the discharge of his duties.
- b. Assume the duties of the National Commander in the event of his absence, illness, or call to eternal patrol.
- c. Execute the powers and authority of the National Commander, when required, in the absence of the National Commander.
- d. Serve as a member of the Board of Directors.
- e. Act as Chairman for the Ways and Means Committee.
- f. Act as Chairman for the Audit Committee.
- g. Serve as a member of the Scholarship Committee.
- h. Be responsible for the content, publication, and distribution of the National Publication.
- i. Prepare and present an annual report relative to the operation of his office at the Annual Business Meeting.
- j. Work up, keep current and pass on, immediately to his relief a "Turn Over" folder, including all official correspondence, records, and official materials assigned to his care.

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## NEWS-07: Duties of the National Commander

Submitted by: Pat Householder on 10/20/2011

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The duties of the National Commander shall include, but not be limited to:

- a. Act as the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman of the Board of Directors.
- b. Cause to be called all regular and special meetings of the organization.
- c. Preside over all regular and special meetings of the organization.
- d. Enforce the Constitution and Bylaws.
- e. Direct and supervise the operation of the organization.
- f. Prepare and present the Board of Directors Annual Report at the Annual Business Meeting.
- g. Submit, in writing, to the Board of Directors for confirmation, all appointed officers and committee chairmanships except as noted in specific committees where the Chairman is listed by the position he fills in USSVI.
- h. Sign all certificates notes, drafts, or bills of exchange, warrants or other orders for the payment of moneys duly drawn by the National Treasurer, except as provided elsewhere in the Constitution and Bylaws, subject to the approval of the Board of Directors.
- i. Be responsible for the promulgation of all pertinent information to the membership of the organization.
- j. Work up, keep current, and pass on immediately to his relief a "Turn Over" folder, including all official correspondence, records, and official materials assigned to his care.
- k. Be an ex-officio member of all committees, except the "Nominations Committee".



### **Holland Club**

Perch Base is proud to have over 50 Holland Club members on our rolls. Although these valued shipmates don't meet or function as a "group within the group," they are active and important participants of the Base.




## Eternal Patrol November 7, 1944

Editors Note: Less we forget, each month, one boat on eternal patrol will be highlighted in this newsletter. Sailors, rest your oars.

### The Final Patrol

Lord, this departed shipmate with dolphins on his chest  
Is part of an outfit known as the best.  
Make him welcome and take him by the hand.  
You'll find without a doubt he was the best in all the land.  
So, heavenly Father add his name to the roll  
Of our departed shipmates still on patrol  
Let them know that we who survive  
Will always keep their memories alive.



### USS Albacore (SS-218) 7 November 1944 86 men lost



### USS Albacore (SS-218)

*(Edited) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia*

**USS Albacore (SS-218)** was a Gato-class submarine which served in the Pacific Theater of Operations during World War II, winning four Presidential Unit Citations and nine battle stars for her service. During the war, she

was credited with sinking 13 Japanese ships (including two destroyers, a light cruiser, and the aircraft carrier *Taihō*) and damaging another five; not all of these credits were confirmed by postwar JANAC accounting. She also holds the distinction of sinking the most warship tonnage of any U.S. submarine.

Albacore was the second ship of the United States Navy to be named for the albacore. Her keel was laid on 21 April 1941 by the Electric Boat Company in Groton, Connecticut. She was launched on 17 February 1942 and commissioned on 1 June 1942.

### 1942

Following shakedown, the submarine proceeded via the Panama Canal to Pearl Harbor and, from that base on 28 August 1942, began her first war patrol, to waters of the north and northeast pass through the coral reef which surrounds Truk. On 13 September, Albacore sighted two cargo vessels in column and prepared for her first combat action. She made a submerged approach and fired three torpedoes at the leading ship and two at the second. One or two torpedoes hit on the first ship; none struck the second. Albacore claimed to have damaged the leading vessel.

Her next enemy contact came on 1 October when she made a night surface attack on a Japanese tanker. She expended seven torpedoes and scored two hits. Although the tanker appeared to be low in the water, she was still able to leave the scene under her own power. On 9 October, Albacore spotted a *Shōkaku*-class aircraft carrier escorted by a heavy cruiser and a destroyer, but the submarine was depth charged by the escorts and forced to break off her pursuit. The next day, she attacked a freighter. One torpedo hit the mark, and 12 minutes after firing, the sound of two heavy explosions caused the submarine's crew to presume they had downed the vessel.



### Gato-class diesel-electric submarine

Displacement: 1,549 tons (surf) 2,463 tons (sub)  
Length: 311 ft 9 in; Beam: 27 ft 3 in; Draft: 17 ft 0 in]  
4 × Fairbanks-Morse Model 38D8- $\frac{1}{8}$  9-cylinder diesel engines driving electrical generators; 2 × 126-cell Sargo batteries]  
4 × high-speed GE electric motors with reduction gears two propellers]  
5,400 shp (surf); 2,740 shp (sub)  
Speed: 21 kn (surf); 9 kn (sub)  
Range: 11,000 nmi surfaced at 10 kn  
Endurance: 48 hours at 2 kn submerged  
75 days on patrol  
Test depth: 300 ft  
Complement: 6 officers, 54 enlisted  
Armament: 10 × 21-inch torpedo tubes (six forward, four aft)  
24 torpedoes  
1 × 4-inch/ 50 caliber deck gun  
Bofors 40 mm and Oerlikon 20 mm cannon

Beginning on the mid-morning of 11 October, Albacore was depth charged numerous times. At 1548, the conning officer finally spotted the Japanese attackers, two submarine chasers and an airplane. A third ship equipped with sound gear joined the group and continued the hunt. The ships crisscrossed over Albacore, close enough for propeller noise to reverberate throughout her hull and compelled her to proceed at silent running, with her ventilator fans shut down. After a chase of nearly seven hours, the Japanese ships disappeared astern, and Albacore then surfaced to clear the immediate area. The next day, Albacore headed for Midway Island. Although she had several opportunities to score during the patrol, Albacore was not credited with any damage to Japanese shipping. The submarine arrived at Midway Island on 20 October and commenced a refit.



With her refurbishing completed and a new Oerlikon 20 mm cannon installed, Albacore sailed on 11 November for her second patrol. Her assigned areas were the Roger St. George's Channel, New Britain, along the east coast of New Guinea to Vitiaz Strait, and the Dallman Pass off Madang harbor. On 24 November, the submarine spotted a convoy of two cargo vessels. Albacore maneuvered into position and fired two stern tubes, but neither torpedo found its target. Two days later, on 26 November, Albacore herself became the quarry. Two Japanese destroyers depth charged her and the explosions caused numerous small leaks around the cable packing glands in the pressure hull. After a two-hour chase, the Japanese retired, and Albacore shifted her patrol area to Vitiaz Strait. Another golden opportunity arose on 13 December, when Albacore found three Japanese destroyers. She released a three-torpedo spread but again was unsuccessful. On 18 December, Albacore was stationed off Madang. The submarine discovered what seemed to be a transport and a destroyer.

Albacore torpedoed the "transport," and it exploded in a mass of flames and sank. Albacore had in fact downed Tenryū, and the second Japanese cruiser sunk by an American submarine in World War II. Albacore put into port at Brisbane, Australia, on 30 December.

### **1943**

After an overhaul of her engines, Albacore got underway on 20 January 1943 to begin her third patrol. Off the north coast of New Guinea, she spotted 11 targets in as many days. The first group, encountered on 20 February, consisted of a destroyer and a frigate escorting a minelayer. Albacore fired ten torpedoes and believed she had sunk the destroyer and damaged the frigate. In the following days, Albacore attacked one tanker, several freighters, and another destroyer. Of eight torpedoes expended during these actions, all missed their targets. When Albacore ended her patrol at Brisbane on 11 March, she was credited with sinking one destroyer and a frigate for a total of 2,250 tons.

Albacore was briefly dry-docked for repairs and underwent refresher training before sailing for a fourth patrol on 6 April. This time, her area was around the Solomon Islands and Bismarck Islands and off the north coast of New Guinea. While she sighted several convoys, she recorded no hits. Albacore returned to Brisbane on 26 May.

On 16 June, Albacore was underway for her fifth patrol and waters surrounding the Bismarcks and the Solomons. During this patrol, she sighted three separate convoys and attacked two. Albacore claimed to have damaged a transport on 19 July but the submarine failed to sink any vessels. Albacore arrived back at Brisbane and began a refit alongside Fulton.

On 23 August, Albacore left to patrol roughly the same area as on her previous assignment. She spotted a Japanese submarine on 31 August but was unable to press home an attack. On 4 September, she encountered a two-ship convoy protected by two escorts and sank one of the ships, Heijo Maru, with three torpedo hits made shortly after the initial contact. The submarine then pursued the other vessel for the next two days but was able to inflict only minor hull damage on her target. She terminated her patrol at Brisbane on 26 September.

Albacore's seventh patrol began on 12 October 1943. She fired six torpedoes at a large merchant ship on 25 October but recorded no hits. On 6 November, she received a report of a convoy which had been spotted by Steelhead, and began to search for it. On 8 November, the submarine found the convoy and started to track it. However, a plane from the Fifth Army Air Force bombed her and caused her to lose contact with the Japanese ships. The submarine sustained no damage.

Albacore was again bombed by American aircraft on 10 November. This time, the submarine suffered considerable damage. All auxiliary power was knocked out, and the submarine was plunged into total darkness. The main induction valve went under water before it was shut, and it began filling up with water. Albacore plunged to a depth of 450 feet (140 m) before her dive was checked. For the next two and one-half hours, she bounced between 30

feet (10 m) and 400 feet (120 m) while at various attitudes. She finally managed to return to the surface with her trim almost restored. The submarine re-submerged, and it was decided to continue the patrol while simultaneously making necessary repairs.

Following this ordeal, Albacore received orders to locate and attack Agano, which had been hit and damaged by Scamp. Albacore found Agano on 12 November and tried to attack, but Japanese destroyers held the submarine down with a four-hour depth charge barrage.

On 25 November, Albacore sank Japanese army transport Kenzan Maru. She returned to Brisbane on 5 December.

Albacore departed Australia on 26 December to patrol north of the Bismarck Islands. She spotted her first target on 12 January 1944 and sank Choko Maru with two separate torpedo attacks. Two days later, in company with Scamp and Guardfish, she blew up Sazanami (flushed by Guardfish) with four shots from Albacore's stern tubes. Another destroyer pinned Albacore down and delivered fifty-nine depth charges, leaving Scamp and Guardfish free to pursue the three tankers; they succeeded in sinking one each. Following more than a fortnight of uneventful patrolling, the submarine headed home. She made brief fuel stops at Tulagi and Midway Island before reaching Pearl Harbor on 22 February. After three days of repairs to get her ready for the voyage, Albacore continued on to the Mare Island Navy Yard in Vallejo, California for overhaul.

## **1944**

Albacore left Mare Island on 5 May 1944 and held training exercises with Shad (SS-235) en route to Hawaii. Albacore reached Pearl Harbor on 13 May and spent the next two weeks on final repairs and training. Albacore began her ninth patrol on 29 May, and was assigned waters west of the Mariana Islands and around the Palau Islands. In the next few days, she made only one contact, a Japanese convoy which she encountered on 11 June. But before the submarine could maneuver into attack position, a Japanese aircraft forced her to dive and lose contact.

### **The Sinking of Taihō**


On the morning of 18 June, two days after American forces began landing on Saipan, Albacore shifted from her position west of the Mariana Islands to a new location 100 miles (160 km) further south. Admiral Lockwood (ComSubPac)



ordered this move in the hope of enabling the submarine to intercept a Japanese task force (under command of Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa) reportedly steaming from Tawi toward Saipan. At about 0800 the next morning, Albacore raised her periscope and found herself in the midst of Ozawa's main carrier group. The captain allowed one Japanese carrier to pass unharmed and selected a second one for his target. Once inside 5,300 yards (4,800 m), the submarine's Torpedo Data Computer started giving false information. To maximize the odds of a hit, the CO fired all six bow tubes. The carrier was in the process of launching an air strike, and one of the pilots (Sakio Komatsu) intentionally dove his plane into a torpedo, setting it off early. Three Japanese destroyers immediately

charged Albacore. While the submarine was diving to escape, her crew heard one solid torpedo explosion. About that same time, 25 depth charges began raining down on the submarine. Then they heard "a distant and persistent explosion of great force" followed by another.

One of Albacore's torpedoes had hit the carrier. It was Ozawa's flagship, Japanese aircraft carrier Taihō, 31,000 tons, the newest and largest in the Japanese fleet. The explosion jammed the ship's forward aircraft elevator; its pit filled with gasoline, water, and fuel. However, no fire erupted, and the flight deck was unharmed. The one torpedo hit on Taihō caused little concern on board. Ozawa still "radiated confidence and satisfaction" and by 11:30 had launched raids Three and Four. Meanwhile, a novice took over the damage-control work. He thought the best way to handle gasoline fumes was to open up the ship's ventilation system and let them disperse. When he did, the fumes spread all through the ship. Unknown to anybody on board, Taihō became a floating time bomb. About 3:30 that afternoon, Taihō was jolted by a severe explosion. A senior staff officer on the bridge saw the flight deck heave up. The sides blew out. Taihō dropped out of formation and began to settle in the water, clearly doomed. Though Admiral Ozawa wanted to go down with the ship, his staff prevailed on him to survive and to shift his quarters to Japanese cruiser Haguro.



Taking the Emperor's portrait, Ozawa transferred to Haguro by destroyer. After he left, Taihō was torn by a second thunderous explosion and sank stern first, carrying down 1,650 officers and men.

No one on Albacore thought Taihō had sunk, and her skipper was angry for "missing a golden opportunity." After this action, Albacore was assigned lifeguard duty for planes striking Yap and Ulithi. On 2 July, Albacore shifted over to intercept traffic between Yap and the Palau Islands. The submarine spotted a wooden inter-island steamer loaded with Japanese civilians. Albacore decided to stage a surface gun attack. After insuring the ship was afire, Albacore dived to avoid an airplane. The submarine surfaced soon thereafter and picked up five survivors.

Albacore put in to Majuro on 15 July. She was praised for an aggressive patrol and received credit for damaging a Shōkaku-class carrier. American code breakers lost track of Taihō after the Battle of the Philippine Sea and, while puzzled, did not realize she had gone down. Only months later did a prisoner of war reveal her sinking.

After a refit alongside Bushnell, the submarine began her tenth patrol on 8 August. Her assignment was the Bungo Suido-Kii Suido area, and, during this period, Albacore was credited with sinking two Japanese vessels, a cargo ship and a submarine chaser. The patrol ended at Pearl Harbor on 25 September.

### Loss

Albacore left Pearl Harbor on 24 October 1944, topped off her fuel tanks at Midway Island on 28 October, and was never heard from again. According to Japanese records captured after the war, a submarine (presumed to be Albacore) struck a naval mine very close to the shore off northeastern Hokkaidō on 7 November 1944. A Japanese patrol boat witnessed the explosion of a submerged submarine and saw a great deal of heavy oil, cork, bedding, and food supplies rise to the surface. On 21 December, Albacore was presumed lost. Her name was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register on 30 March 1945.



- The first Japanese casualty to American arms during WW-II was an aircraft shot down on Dec. 7th, 1941 by the Tautog.
- The first submarine force casualty suffered in WW-II was G. A. Myers, Seaman 2, shot through the right lung when Cachalot was strafed during the Pearl Harbor raid.
- The first "live" torpedoes to be fired by a Pearl Harbor submarine were fired by the Triton (Lent), 4 stern tubes fired on the night of Dec. 10, 1941.
- The first Pearl Harbor boat to be depth charged was the Plunger (White) on Jan. 4, 1942, 24 charges.
- The first "down the throat" shot was fired by Pompano on Jan. 17, 1942.
- The first Japanese warship to be sunk was torpedoed by **Gudgeon** (Grenfell) at 9 AM on Jan. 27, 1942, the IJN I-173 (SS).
- The first major Japanese warship lost to submarines during WW-II was the heavy cruiser Kako which fell victim to S-44 Moore) on Aug. 10, 1942.
- The first submarine to fire on a battleship was Flying Fish (Donaho) Sept. 1942, damaging a Kongo class BB.
- The first submarine to fire on an aircraft carrier was Trout (Ramage), damaging Taiyo, August 28, 1942.
- The first Japanese ship to be sunk by gunfire was by Triton (Kirkpatrick), near Marcus Island on Feb. 17, 1942. At the time, Kirkpatrick was the youngest skipper to get command at Pearl.
- The first man to die in submarine gun action was Michael Harbin, on Silversides, May 1942.
- The first rest camp for submarine crews was established at a military encampment at Malang, in the mountains of Java, 89 miles from Surabaya. Three days were allotted to submarine crews there in January 1942.
- The first TDC (Mark 1) was installed in the Cachalot.
- The Plunger was the first boat to sustain an "arduous" depth charge attack and survive.
- In September 1936, Cdr. C. A. Lockwood Jr., assumed command of SubDiv 13 composed of the new boats Pike, Porpoise, Shark and Tarpon.



## CHAPLAIN'S COLUMN

The Chaplain has nothing to report other than that under the Binnacle List.

### IMPORTANT

*Shipmates, you should ensure that your next of kin is aware of the information in the box, right.*

In the case of my death, please immediately notify the U.S. Submarine Veterans Inc., (USSVI) at 877-542-3483 or 360-337-2978 and give the person on duty the information regarding my death, funeral, and burial arrangements, plus who they can contact for follow-up and support.

Please ask them to contact my local chapter's Base Commander with this information as well (they can look it up in their membership records).

This information can alternatively be E-Mailed to the National Of-



## SHIPMATES RUNNING ON LESS THAN A FULL BATTERY CHARGE

Stan Reinhold has been moved to the Rehab portion on the Barrow Neurological Institute. He is in Room 2R13D now. It is a semi-private room (he has a roommate). And the room is small. The phone number is 602-406-2834.

He would still appreciate the calls and visits. I am sure he will be there for a while.



## Need a Ride to a Base Meeting or Other Function?

Contact Base vice-Commander, [Howard Doyle \(602\) 228-2445](tel:6022282445) or any other Base Officer. All officers are listed near the front of every copy of the MidWatch.

## Perch and Gudgeon Base Shipmate Brad Veek's Wife is Bid Fairwell In Prescott Service



The service site on at Prescott National Memorial Cemetery during the September 30 ceremony.

A closer view of the attendees.



Brad Veek talks to the guests at his wife's ceremony.

## WWII and Perch Base Shipmate Dick Caraker is Honored Departing on Eternal Patrol



American Legion members began the brief ceremony.



The same group provided a ceremonial firing squad.



Army personnel fold the flag.



Perch Base patiently waits to bid farewell to a shipmate.



Our Chaplain reads the brief articles . . . a single bell toll. Sailor rest your oar, we have the watch.



## On the Passing of a Shipmate




The funeral service for our shipmate Dick Caraker at the Anglican church in Tempe was well attended and a little different than previous ones for WWII shipmates. Like a church service on Sunday we sang hymns and the first hymn we sang was most appropriate for sailors. It was, "Eternal Father." I wished I had known sooner so I could have sent a submariners verse to their soloist. This verse, while not official, was written by one of our WWII crew aboard Thresher after a few war patrols.

*Eternal Father with thy power  
This pigboat shield in danger's hour.  
From bomb and depth charge down below  
Protect us wheresoe'r we go.  
And hear us when we cry to Thee  
For those in peril on the sea.*

Billy Grieves



## COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER'S REPORT



This issue of the MidWatch starts a new format that I hope will make our information clearer and put more emphasis on areas that should have it.

The creed is up front on the cover page followed by a bigger -- and more detailed -- section on the Lost Boats for the month. Also, the contributors to the Perch Base Foundation are more prominent as are the Base officers.

I have also included headers for topic-areas that may be more applicable to other Bases, but are included to bring us in line with a "national standard." These include a header for SubVettes, National news, Holland Club, etc. These are either not relevant during the current month to our Base or we report them but do it quicker with **Flash Traffic**. But, I have created headers for these topics to show that the topic is not forgotten; it just isn't "us."

As always, my shipmates' comments are appreciated.



### THE WOMEN OF PERCH BASE

**At their October 2009 meeting, Perch Base SubVettes had voted to disband. Participation and finances made this a logical action. Since then, sponsored woman have been incorporated in Perch Base as Associate Members with all rights therein where they are vigorous participants. Activities of Base ladies is, therefor, activities of the Base**

# CLASSIFIED

## ITEMS FOR SALE BY SHIPMATES

SHIPS PLAQUES FOR SALE. I have the following ships plaques (TECUMSEH, HENRY CLAY, SUBRON 15, BEN FRANKLIN, TIRU, SALMON, DANIEL BOONE, RONQUIL) that will be sold for \$25 each. These plaques had belonged to Frank Rumbaugh and all proceeds to be donated to the Dolphin Scholarship Fund. They will be available at the next meeting OR I will accept orders prior to the meeting.

*Dan Moss*



The dates for the next Kaps-4-Kids has not been set. We continue to look for additional children's health facilities to visit.

# November Base Birthdays

<b>BILL SHERMAN</b>	<b>Nov. 4</b>
<b>MIKE KEATING</b>	<b>Nov. 6</b>
<b>ROGER M. MILLER</b>	<b>Nov. 7</b>
<b>LARRY RANKIN</b>	<b>Nov. 11</b>
<b>BILL TIPPETT</b>	<b>Nov. 14</b>
<b>HARRY ELLIS</b>	<b>Nov. 17</b>
<b>ROGER R. MILLER</b>	<b>Nov. 25</b>
<b>BOB GILMORE, JR.</b>	<b>Nov. 30</b>



- On December 31, 1941, Captain Wilkes evacuated Corrigidor on board the Seawolf to establish a new base at Surabaya, Java. Simultaneously Capt. Fife boarded Swordfish and sailed to Darwin, Australia.
- Expressing the view that Japan could not hope to be victorious in a war with the U.S., Admiral Yamamoto was “shanghaied” to the post of Commander of the Combined Fleet (from the Naval Ministry) to thwart a possible assassination at the hands of his many dissenters.
- A survivor of the Japanese carrier Kaga, at the Battle of Midway, told how some of his shipmates saved themselves by clinging to the air flask of a torpedo fired from Nautilus which hit the carrier and failed to explode, the concussion separating the warhead from the air flask.
- LCDR. Francis White was the only skipper who lost two submarines in combat, the S-39 and the S-44.
- The IJN I-176 (Cdr. Kosaburo Yamaguchi) was the only Japanese boat to sink an American submarine (Corvina) during the war.
- The last Japanese submarine to be sunk in the Pacific, the I-373, was torpedoed by Spikefish (Monaghan) on the morning of 13 Aug. 1945, in the East China Sea.
- As late as July 1945 Japanese guns on the cliffs of Lombok Strait shelled the Loggerhead as she proceeded through the strait on the surface
- In July 1945 Bugara (Schade) operating in the Gulf of Siam, sank 12 junks, 24 schooners, 16 coasters, 3 sea trucks and one naval auxiliary, all by gunfire.

# "Red October" No More: Russia Scraps Cold War-Era Typhoon Subma-

The Telegraph (UK), September 30

Russia is to definitively scrap its legendary typhoon class nuclear-powered submarine, the deadly Soviet-era vessel that inspired the Hollywood blockbuster *The Hunt for Red October*. The decision, which was disclosed by military sources in the daily *Izvestia* newspaper, marks the end of an era that will see the three remaining Typhoon class submarines that remain in service in Russia's Northern Fleet cut up and turned into scrap metal by 2014.




The giant Typhoon-class submarine was a fixture of the Cold War and at 562 feet long and 80 foot wide was the biggest submarine ever built.

It was also one of the deadliest and was able to launch up to twenty intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying as many as two hundred independently targeted warheads (ten warheads per missile).

But in recent years, the underfunded Russian navy has struggled to keep the three remaining submarines fully operational with only one of the three said to routinely be carrying nuclear weapons, while the other two are said to carry conventional weapons only.

US author Tom Clancy based his 1984 book 'The Hunt for Red October' on the giant vessel (six of which were ever built) with good reason however. It was the first Soviet nuclear submarine to have the capacity to launch a missile from beneath the polar ice sheet without being detected on satellite and its engines were much quieter than its predecessors, making it much tougher to track.



In the 1990 Hollywood film based on the book, Sean Connery plays a Soviet submarine commander who defects to the United States in a submarine similar to the Typhoon-class, arguing that it is wrong for the USSR alone to possess such a powerful first strike weapon.

The legendary submarine appears to have become a victim of post Cold-War realities however. Three have already been scrapped to comply with nuclear disarmament commitments, and Russian navy chiefs now believe that the three remaining vessels are no longer needed either. The main reason is that a new smaller generation of nuclear submarine is in the process of being rolled out (the Borei) which is considered to have superseded the giant Soviet-era vessel.

The new subs are cheaper to run, require far fewer crew, and have been specially designed to carry Russia's new generation of Bulava sea-launched nuclear missiles. In contrast, two of the three older Typhoon-class subs need to undergo expensive conversion work before they can even fire the new missiles.

The old subs are also said to cost at least £6 million a year in running costs which is deemed too high.

Under the so-called new START nuclear arms reduction treaty that Russia and the United States signed last year, Moscow is only able to deploy a maximum of 1,550 nuclear warheads anyway. The three ageing Soviet-eras are capable of carrying 600 warheads between them and Russia is said to be keen to use other more modern launch vehicles to fill its quota (including silo-based ICBMs and strategic bombers)



# Torpedo Development During WWII

## Part 2 of 2

On 18 July 1942 the second depth test was conducted off Albany this time by the **USS SAURY (SS-189)** who fired 4 **Mark 14** torpedoes set for 10 feet at a net 850 to 900 yards from the firing point. The first one was wasted because the net had



carried away during the night but the other three all set for 10 feet penetrated the net at 21 feet. **BuOrd** was informed of these results on 20 July in a dispatch, which also requested that the Bureau conduct tests using equivalent **Mark 16** heads to determine depth performance with zero settings.

Concern over torpedo performance had also arisen in the mind of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. In a letter dated 21 July 1942 to the Chief of **BuOrd** he requested that the Bureau proceed immediately to recheck the technical data for the **Mark 14** submarine torpedo fitted with the **Mark 15** and **Mark 16** warhead. The Bureau had fired them from a torpedo barge and not from a submarine. The Commander in Chief stated that submarine war patrol reports continued

to indicate a lack of confidence in the accuracy of the tactical data of the **Mark 14** torpedo particularly in depth performance. He stated that the difference in weights and lengths of the several war and exercise heads indicated there was a definite possibility there were valid reasons for this lack of confidence. He stressed that it was of utmost importance not only to supply submarine personnel with correct data but in addition to take steps to restore their confidence in the reliability and accuracy of the performance data furnished them.

On 29 July 1942 **ComSubPac** informed his submarines that torpedoes ran 11 feet deeper than set and ordered them to set all torpedoes to run about 5 feet but no more than 10 feet deeper than the estimated target's draft but to subtract 11 feet to obtain the correct depth setting.

On the first of August 1942, almost eight months after the outbreak of the war, **BuOrd** informed interested parties that tests being conducted at Newport firing (Mark 14) torpedoes from a submarine at periscope depth showed the torpedo to be running 10 feet deeper than set when using **Mark 16** warheads.

The conclusion was inescapable. When set for zero feet and fired from a submarine at periscope depth, **Mark 14** torpedoes ran 10 feet deep at both high and low powers. The depth control mechanism, of the **Mark 14** torpedo was improperly designed and inadequately tested. It was necessary to make alterations to the depth control mechanism of all **Mark 14** torpedoes before their performance became reliable. Equipment and instructions for these alterations were sent out from Newport. When these were made the **Mark 14** could be trusted to run within 3 feet of the set depth.

### EFFECTS OF TORPEDO FAILURE ON MORALE

All of these difficulties had considerable influence on the morale of the officers and men of the submarine force. In 1939 and 1940, the German Submarine Force had almost parallel difficulty with their torpedoes. German influence exploders prematurely and failed to fire. Because accurate depth control was not necessary if influence exploders operated properly the depth performance of German torpedoes was indifferent. Both of these defects had to be corrected and a reliable contact exploder developed before German submarines became fully effective. Admiral Doenitz testified that the effect of their torpedo defects upon German submarine morale was profound and strenuous efforts had to be exerted to restore the confidence of submarine personnel in their primary weapon.

The torpedo failure period was not as long for the German Navy as it was for the American Submarines. The Germans were spared that awful concatenation of defects, so depressing to the Americans when for a period of nearly two years, the discovery and correction of these successive defects appeared only to unmask new and more serious difficulties with the torpedoes. Moreover, whereas the German's torpedo troubles were imposed upon a general background of victory, the American submariners had to sweat through their difficulties during a period when the forces of the enemy were generally triumphant. If it is true that only in defeat can a military force show the caliber of its morale, then the Submarine Force truly deserves to be called great, for even when the failure of their weapons was superimposed on a pattern of defeat, their morale faltered.

There were casualties of course.

In a few cases, Commanding Officers, introspective after repeated failures to get hits, asked to be relieved of their command in order that others might try where they had failed. In the early months of the war, the harsh realities of repeated allied defeats demanded a ruthless policy of removal of Commanding Officers who failed to get results without stopping to examine

the reasons for that failure. Undoubtedly torpedo defects contributed greatly to lack of success that of these removals.

It is difficult to imagine a severer trial for a submarine crew's morale than a series of unexplained torpedo failures. As one submarine commander remarked, there is no better stimulant to morale than the sound of detonations of your own torpedoes against the hull of the enemy. On the other hand the depths of despondency are plumbed by the crew that listens in vain for that sound as the seconds stretch on after firing and nothing happens.

***The crew of a submarine is a team. Its success depends upon the skill, the judgment and the courage of the Commanding Officer. Nevertheless the Commanding Officer is still only a member of that team and he can rise to no greater heights than his teammates are able to carry him. The team can approach perfection only when each member has such trust in the ability and in integrity of the others that he can devote himself unreservedly to the perfection of his own task, confidently entrusting to his shipmates his life, and the hope of successful culmination of his efforts.***

When the submarine is in attack position, the fire control party has correlatively solved its intricate problem and the torpedomen have properly adjusted their temperamental charges, they have a right to expect their CO to deliver a successful attack against the enemy. A failure or two can be shrugged off as bad luck, particularly when a crew and a Commander have had previous successes together. When failures are repeated, however, doubts began to creep in. A Commanding Officer, who misses under such circumstances that a miss is improbable, is duty bound to carefully examine the performance of his torpedo crew. The torpedo crew that knows its work has been ably and carefully performed then feels that its work is under suspicion. Moreover they know that only the CO sees the target and they would be less than human if they did not commence to have doubts as to his ability. Repeated and unexplained misses tended to break down, the solidarity of a submarine crew.

## **PREMATURES**

Not so subtle was the effect of premature torpedo explosions. When these occurred soon after firing, there was no mystery about the cause of the failure to damage the enemy. Often the submarine was subjected to a severe jolt by early explosions. Pre-matures forewarned the target of the attack. Not only could the target then evade, but the submarine's approximate position was pointed out to the escorts. When the target escaped damage there was less confusion in a convoy and the subsequent anti-submarine action was usually more efficiently conducted. When a submarine that experienced a premature not only failed to damage the enemy, but often in turn was severely worked over. It has been impossible to determine whether or not pre-matures contributed to the loss of any of our submarines, but that such was the case is not at all unlikely.

A small percentage of pre-matures were encountered from the very beginning. These were most annoying and sometimes subjected the Submarine to grave risks. It was not until after the depth control difficulty had been corrected however that the extent of the premature problem became apparent. When running deep, torpedoes were influenced by the action of the waves. Also, some of the early torpedoes ran so deep that the anti-counter mining device kept the firing pin safely locked not only during the run of the torpedo but while it passed under the target as well. When torpedoes actually began running at the set depths. Perturbations of the torpedo caused by the motion of the sea, or by surges in the torpedo power plant, were sufficient to actuate the delicate exploder and caused the torpedo to blow up before it reached the target. The percentage of pre-matures was greatly increased by the correction of this depth control difficulty.

In addition to the pre-matures that could be observed from the submarine, intelligence began to collect evidence of faulty torpedo performances. A Korean prisoner from the BRAZIL MARU stated that his ship had been hit by a dud earlier on the same night that she was sunk. A submarine prisoner of the war when asked the question, "Does the Japanese Navy have any trouble with premature explosions?" He replied with a smile, "We don't, but you do". After the depth control was improved many serious cases of pre-matures were reported by submarines.

**USS TUNNY (SS-282)** Commanding Officer Scott, returned from her first war patrol in February 1943. She had encountered considerable trouble with torpedo performance including one dud, and one premature. In March 1943, SCAMP's Commanding Officer Ebert, on her first war patrol and on her first attack fired a 3 torpedo salvo in which all torpedoes pre-matured shortly after arming. Of her first 9 torpedoes fired on that patrol five pre-matured. Depth settings had been between 6 and 10 feet. SCAMP inactivated her remaining torpedoes at sea with **ComSubPac [LOCKWOOD.]**



Confidence in the reliability of the **Mark 6** exploder waned rapidly during the first 6 months of 1943. Mechanical imperfections in its complex mechanism repeatedly came to light necessitating the exchange of considerably correspondence between forces afloat and the **BuOrd**. The intricacies of the previously secret mechanism became known to many and many were the theories and suggestions for its improvement. Brush riggings were found to be imperfect and leaky base

plate castings slipped by the factory inspection tests. Minor design changes were made by the Newport Torpedo Station and torpedo shops afloat submitted each exploder mechanism exploder to exhaustive and rigid tests before issue to individual submarines. Everything possible short of designing a completely new influence exploder was done and still torpedoes blew up shortly after arming, or exploded harmlessly a short distance from the sides of the targets.

On 27 April 1943 **BuOrd** stated that, the **Mark 6** Exploder was susceptible to pre-maturing when set for 12 foot depth or less and recommended inactivation for contact shots.

On 3 May 1943 **BuOrd** informed **Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet [KING]** that the effectiveness of the **Mark 6** exploder would be increased 10 to 30 per cent by increasing the arming distance from 450 to 700 yards. On 7 May **BuOrd** recommended that north of 30° north magnetic latitude, the device be rendered operative and torpedoes be set to run at keel depth. South of 30° south magnetic it was recommended that the **Mark 6** Exploder be rendered inoperative. In between these latitudes it was recommended torpedoes be set to run at keel depth or less and the influence exploder kept operative.

On 27 May **CinCUS** told **BuOrd** that a reduction in torpedo arming distance was not acceptable for submarines, aircraft or motor torpedo boat torpedoes. It was further stated that he concurred in the recommendation of **ComSubPac** that the **Mark 6** Mod-I exploder be replaced at the earliest possible moment by a single foolproof magnetic exploder.

On 24 June 1943 **CinCPacFlt** ordered **ComSubPac** and **ComDesPac** to inactivate magnetic exploders on all torpedoes. The next day **BuOrd** asked **CinCPac** what reasons had led to this decision. **CinCPac** replied that it had been made because of probable enemy counter measures, because of the ineffectiveness of the exploder under certain conditions and because of the impracticability of selecting the proper conditions under which to fire. On 28 June **ComSubs7thFleet** asked **ComSubPac** if he had any information concerning the inactivation of the **Mark 6** exploder in addition to that given in a **BuOrd** dispatch of 7 May. On 11 July **CTF-71** directed that the magnetic feature be retained in his command and specified the depth settings to be used against various types of ships.

A long **Bureau of Ordnance** letter on the **Mark 6** exploder was dated 31 August 1943. The advantages to be obtained by its use were stated as:

- (α) Saving the misses which would occur when torpedoes, otherwise satisfactory, run deep, or incident to error in depth setting or in estimate of target draft.
- (β) Sometime greater damage from under bottom explosions to capital ships, the sides of which are compartmented to localize torpedo damage. The remaining discussion showed under what conditions the exploder might be expected to work and those under which it would get. Magnetic Latitude, target's magnetic course, conditions of degaussing, beam of target, draft of target and depth of torpedo were all factors bearing on the question.

**Commander Submarines 7th Fleet [ComSubs7thFlt]** continued to send his submarines to sea with activated **Mark 6** exploders.

- (1) Because it saved some hits.
- (2) Because it is our only defensive weapon against the Anti-Submarine craft.
- (3) If we discard it, it is gone forever.

Southwest Pacific **[7th Fleet] [ComSubs7thFlt]** submarines continued to have prematures. On 13 July 1943 **USS GROUPER (SS-214)**, Commanding Officer Hottel, had one of her torpedoes explode close aboard and shower the boat with fragments. On **USS SILVERSIDES (SS-236)**, Commanding Officer Coe, Sixth War Patrol on 2 August 1943 the first two torpedoes of a four-torpedo salvo pre-matured and caused the target to evade. Her second attack on the same patrol also had 2 prematures. **GROUPER** returned from another patrol 11 October 1943 and among other comments recommending inactivation of the **Mark 6** exploder stated. "It would appear far better to sink the enemy vessels encountered, when targets in certain areas are so hard to find and attack, then to continue spoiling good chances just to prove that a really useless mechanism can be made to function a fair proportion of the time".

In a letter dated 8 October 1943 **ComSubs7thFlt** told the **Bureau of Ordnance** that since the installation of the latest **BuOrd** alteration to the (**Mark 6**) exploder the percentage of prematures had risen from 1.71 to 13.5. During December 1943 and January 1944 **USS RASHER (SS-269)** experienced at least 6 and possibly 7 prematures on her second patrol.

**USS SCAMP (SS-277)** had stopped a ship 10 November 1943 and in endeavoring to finish it off experienced a premature which precipitated an immediate counter attack by the escort. Quoting from **SCAMP** report:

"2045[8:45PM] surfaced. Remained in area until 2300[9:00PM]. No further attack was made. Had decided not to fire again until magnetic feature had been inactivated. **SCAMP** had just had her 13th definite premature. (Possibly 15th). She had just fired her 11th (possibly 13<sup>TH</sup>) salvo (out of 17) in which 9 prematures had occurred 9 times it was the 1<sup>st</sup> torpedo fired". Commander Task Force 72's **[CTF-72 FIFE]** endorsement to this Patrol Report read as follows:

The Commanding Officer informed the Task Force Commander **[ComSubs7thFlt]** before inactivating exploders and

under the heart breaking circumstances orders were to the contrary were not issued”.

SCAMP went out with magnetic exploders on her next patrol and had one premature on her first attack, a possible premature on her second attack and a definite premature on her third. On 19 December 1943 in an answer to a query by **CinCPac** as to why 7th Fleet Submarines had not inactivated the magnetic exploder. **ComSubPac** replied that he did not have the authority to order it inactivated.

On 17 January 1944, **USS BOWFIN (SS-287)**, Commanding Officer Griffith, experienced 3 prematures on one attack. In response to a question by **ComSubPac** as to what type of exploder BOWFIN had used. **ComSubs 7th Fleet** on 13 March 1944 explained that BOWFIN's patrol was the end of a long effort to perfect the magnetic exploder and that no further experiments would be made afloat.

When **ComSubPac** ordered the inactivation of the magnetic feature of the exploder in June 1943 it was hoped that the end of serious torpedo difficulties was in sight. Submarine commanders were willing to forego the advantages claimed for the magnetic exploders in order to obtain sure determination of the torpedo against the sides of enemy ships. There was then no reason to doubt that the contact activated portion of the exploder was anything less than certain in its action. There had been many years of experience behind the development of contact exploders.

## **DUDS**

A small percentage of duds had been observed prior to deactivation. On several occasions there had been very good evidence that torpedoes had hit the sides of their targets with full force and had failed to explode. A few failures of even the simpler contact exploder had to be expected. Even though simpler than the magnetic exploder the contact exploder was still a complicated mechanism. Any mistakes in its final check and installation, particularly if it resulted in a flooded exploder, might result in an exploder that failed to function. A few such instances therefore had to be expected. While torpedoes were set to run under the target and fire magnetically the number of contact hits were reduced. The number in each failure could be observed were very few.

**USS TAUTOG (SS-199)**, Lieutenant Commander Willingham, on 28 October 1942 was one of the first to identify a dud. One of two torpedoes was clearly heard by sound, to strike the target without exploding.

On 2 January 1943 **Commander Task Force 51 [CTF-51]** recalled **USS THRESHER (SS-200)**, from patrol to check her torpedoes because of good evidence of exploder failures as both magnetic and contact shots. On her next patrol, which ended on 10 March 1943, THRESHER presented evidence of four definite dud hits. But these instances were comparatively rare until the magnetic exploders were deactivated.




It had been hoped that following inactivation there would be definite indications of more ship sinkings. When this failed to materialize there was considerable disappointment. Finally a clue to this new difficulty was furnished by the **USS TINOSA (SS-283)**, Commanding Officer Daspit, when attacking TOHAN MARU in July 1943.

When Daspit in TINOSA encountered that 19,000-ton tanker he attacked with a four-torpedo salvo on a 95 track. At least two of the torpedoes hit but failed to explode and the target turned away. Daspit then fired a second salvo of two torpedoes on a 145-degree track. There were two hits and two explosions and the target was stopped dead in the water. The accident of the acceptance of a comparatively unfavorable track was most fortunate for it was later proved that the exploder would function when the target was struck a glancing blow although it would probably fail on normal impact. What followed was dramatic and, as it was later proved, of more importance than the disposal of this one very valuable target.

There was no escort. The tanker was at the submarine's mercy except that the big ship's deck guns prohibited a surfaced attack. Commander Daspit was a very careful observer, of an experimental turn of mind, deliberate and unhurried by nature. Carefully he selected a position 875 yards on the target's beam and fired one torpedo. The torpedo was heard by sound to make a normal run. Then the sound of its screws suddenly stopped Daspit observed through the periscope a large splash at the point of aim. There was no explosion. Deliberately Commander Daspit made eight more attacks, scored eight more

Photo # 80-G-63898 USS Scamp in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 1943-1944



hits and not a single explosion. He was careful always to fire from a position on the target's beam with all tracks around 90 degrees. This care and deliberation to select only the best track was later shown to be the explanation for the perfect failure of all exploders. Had they been designed to render the warhead safe on impact, no more consistent performance could have been expected. Through the periscope one torpedo was observed to hit the target, be deflected through 90 degrees by the impact, jump clear of the water and sink. There was no doubt that TINOSA was getting duds on impact. Commander Daspit ceased fire in order to bring in a sample of his torpedoes for analysis. The Japanese came out and towed TOHAN MARU to Truk and TINOSA proceeded on to Pearl Harbor.

When TINOSA got into Pearl Harbor, **ComSubPac** authorized the firing of live torpedoes against submerged cliffs of Kahoolave, Hawaii, to test exploders. One dud **Mark 14** torpedo was produced on this test. By diving the dud was recovered. On examination it was found that the exploder had functioned but the firing pin had not hit the primer with sufficient force to explode it.


What happened next was a practical demonstration of what had been lost by close secrecy. The full development of a complicated mechanism requires the cooperation of many minds and many techniques. When the difficulty with the contact exploder developed the problem was attacked with the full energy of many people. Service Force loaned an Ordnance Technician, Lieutenant Commander E.A. Johnson, USNR. With his assistance a test procedure was devised in which warheads loaded with cinder concrete rather than Torpex, but equipped with exploders, were dropped from a height of 90 feet onto a steel plate. This duplicated the forces generated by a torpedo striking a ship's side. Later complete torpedoes, guided by wire to simulate different angles of impact were dropped into a dry dock. It was discovered that the exploder mechanism would not operate properly against the inertia forces generated by solid normal impact. In short, the exploder mechanism was improperly designed and had been inadequately tested.

The Bureau of Ordnance had been fully informed of the results of this test. On 16 September **BuOrd** informed **ComSubPac** that they too got duds in tests with **Mark 14** torpedoes but that the slower **Mark 18** Electric did not develop this difficulty. It was suggested that success with the **Mark 18** torpedo indicated that the use of low speed settings on the **Mark 14** should give satisfactory exploder performance if the tactical disadvantages could be accepted. By 17 September 1943 **ComSubPac** was convinced that the trouble had been found and three separate corrections were being tested. Lieutenant Commander Johnson produced an electric inertia switch, the shops of Pearl Harbor Submarine Base under Commander D.T. Eddy produced a modification of the firing pin and HOLLAND under the leadership of Captain Perley K. Pendleton produced another firing pin modification. All three of these would work but the electric device was early abandoned in favor of the simpler and more positive firing pin modifications. How many officers and men contributed to these successful modifications will never be known but for months the mail was filled with suggestions for exploder improvements. A wider knowledge of the exploder mechanism meant more minds working on the problem.

Both Submarine Base Pearl Harbor and HOLLAND type firing pin modifications were adopted. Both were extensively tested by warhead drops, then by torpedo drops and finally by live torpedo firings against the cliffs of Kahoolave. On 30 September 1943 **USS BARB (SS-220)**, Commanding Officer Waterman, left the Submarine Base Pearl with 20 torpedoes equipped with the modified firing pin. On 4 October 1943 **BuOrd** approved of **ComSubPac's** alterations pending issue of a satisfactory exploder. By 14 October 1943 all Submarines leaving on patrol could be equipped with the new modifications. This practically ended serious exploder difficulties. The **Bureau of Ordnance** later issued a modified **Mark 6** exploder.

## **ELECTRIC MARK 18 TORPEDOES**

Meanwhile the development of **Mark 18** Electric Torpedo was proceeding. Early in 1942 a German Electric Torpedo had been captured. Off and on for years, an Electric Torpedo had been under development at Newport. It was now decided to turn over the captured German Torpedo to Westinghouse Electrical Manufacturing Company to produce a copy for our submarine use. The development work on the Newport Electric Torpedo would not be abandoned. In this way a new source of torpedo procurement would be opened, there would be no interference with the production of steam torpedoes, and any superior feature of the Newport Electric **Mark 2** torpedo would retain when and if the development was completed.



Many difficulties were encountered. The production of an exact copy was not feasible. Certain parts of the German Torpedo were not adaptable to American manufacturing procedure, the function of certain other features of the torpedo were not fully understood, and the German Torpedo was not adapted to launching from the tubes of American Submarines. The program for the development of the Electric Torpedo bogged down. In April 1943 the Naval Inspector General was called upon by the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet [**ConCUS KING**] to investigate the status of the Electric Torpedo development and determine the reason for the apparent excessive delay in getting that weapon into production. The Inspector General stated that:

*"The delays encountered were largely the result of the manner in which the project was prosecuted and followed up. These difficulties indicated that the Liaison Officers of the Bureau of Ordnance failed to follow up and properly*

*advise the Westinghouse Company and the Exide Company during the development of the Mark 18 torpedoes. The torpedo station had its own Electric Torpedo, the Mark 2, and the personnel assigned to it appeared to have competed and not cooperated with the development of the Mark 18. There was a lack of exchange of information between the Bureau of Ordnance, The Naval Torpedo Station Newport, and the Westinghouse Company, and the Exide Battery Company, which agencies were engaged in the development of the Electric Torpedo. There has not been sufficient understanding and coordination of the submarine torpedo problems in the Bureau of Ordnance. Failure to provide experienced and capable submarine officers to the Bureau for submarine torpedo development has been a very serious matter and has contributed largely to the above deficiencies.”*

The Electric Torpedo had been developed primarily because it was wake less and therefore was very difficult for the target to detect and evade. When the first torpedo reached the proving range it was discovered that in addition, the depth control of the Electric Torpedo was superior to that of the Steam Torpedo, the Electric did not go deep on initial dive after being launched, and the impact exploder was free of many of the troubles that has haunted the Steam Torpedoes. It could be manufactured at a fraction of the cost of the Steam Torpedo and with much less man-hours of labor. Its great disadvantage was its slow speed, thirty knots against 46 for the Steam Torpedo in high power. Submarine officers who assisted in proving the first Electric's were enthusiastic and urged the maximum up in getting the torpedo into service.

The first Electric Torpedoes arrived at Pearl Harbor 23 June 1943. They were used, for school and test purposes. Difficulties had already arisen with hydrogen generation by the storage battery when on open circuit. This had been a matter of considerable correspondence between **ComSubLant** and **BuOrd** and it had been concluded that the risk of hydrogen exploders was acceptable. Nevertheless **ComSubPac** conducted extensive tests to satisfy himself and the Submarine Force that no grave danger to the submarine was involved in carrying Electric Torpedoes. It was proved by experiments that the maximum obtainable torpedo battery explosion would not detonate the warhead. Finally battery explosion was induced in a torpedo in a submarine torpedo tube to prove that no serious consequences would follow such an event. Meanwhile experiments were being conducted to control or minimize the occurrence of explosions. As a result of the cooperation of all hands a hot wire hydrogen burning circuit was devised to burn out the hydrogen as fast as it was formed. This was effective as long as oxygen to combine with the hydrogen existed in the torpedo battery compartment. The use of this hot wire permitted long periods between successive ventilation of the torpedo.

The Electric Torpedo was subject to its full share of infant disease. The first Electric to be taken to sea leaked hydrogen burning circuits and therefore had to be frequently withdrawn from the tubes for ventilation. Several instances of hydrogen fires and explosions occurred. One fire on the **USS FLYING FISH (SS-229)** heated the warhead until the Torpex melted and ran. There were erratic runs, sinkers, and slow speed runs. The tail vanes were weak and had to be strengthened in order to prevent erratic runs by striking against the tube shutters. Cold water and consequent low battery temperature caused the torpedo to run slow and several misses were so caused until this matter became more fully understood. Hot runs in the tubes following depth charging was caused by failure of the guide studs. Warping of the thin shell of the battery compartment caused bindings in the tubes. All of these difficulties were relentlessly tracked down and eliminated one after another.


The Electric Torpedo did not meet with instant acceptance by the submarine force. Many Commanding Officers were skeptical not only because of the tactical limitations imposed by its low speed, but because of the difficulties always to be encountered with a new torpedo. Lack of confidence was the natural heritage of the long history of troubles with the **Mark 14**. For a long time Electric's were taken on patrol strictly on a volunteer basis. **ComSubs7thFlt** on 25 October 1943 told the **BuOrd** that as long as **Mark 14** torpedoes were available he recommended that no electric be allocated to the Southwest Pacific. The reasons given included

- (α) A large proportion of submarine attacks were at present conducted at night, at which time an electric torpedo has very little if any advantage in respect to the wake less feature over the present submarine torpedo.
- (β) The lack of an influence exploder on the **Mark 18** torpedoes.
- (γ) The slow speed of the **Mark 18** torpedoes.
- (δ) The loss of flexibility in the torpedo fire control systems of these submarines yet equipped with torpedo data computers adapted to the electric torpedo.
- (ε) The great lack of personnel afloat who are adequately trained in servicing and maintaining the (Mark 18) torpedo.
- (φ) The normally expected operational difficulties of a weapon so low to the service.
- (γ) The complicated supply problem in respect to spare parts, workshop equipment and tools for the (**Mark 18**) torpedo.

On 28 December 1944 it was necessary for **ComSubs7thFlt** to prohibit the firing of **Mark 18** torpedoes for exercise shots in the Southwest Pacific because the supply, of **Mark 18** torpedoes was insufficient to meet the demand.

Despite their early difficulties the popularity of the electric torpedo grew. The wake less feature, the dependable depth performances at all ranges, and the shallower permissible depth settings were greatly appreciated. **ComSubPac** enthusiastically

pushed its employment and vigorously attacked any difficulties encountered in its use. Thirty percent (30%,) of all submarine torpedoes fired in 1944 were electric. In 1945 the number of electric torpedoes expanded, exceeded the number of steam torpedoes, fully 65% of all submarine torpedoes being fired that year were electric.



- In the early morning hours of June 22, 1945, Barb, (Fluckey) fired a dozen 5-inch rockets into the town of Hokkaido from 5000 yards off shore.
- A Japanese prisoner, recovered from a wrecked aircraft by Atule (Mauer) had the following items in his pockets: 7 packs of Japanese cigarettes, 1 pack of British cigarettes, calling cards, ration books, club tickets, diary, note book, flight record and two magnetic detector tracers, with notes concerning them, a thick wad of money, a vial of perfume and a number of other personal items.
- On the night of 8-9 December 1944, in a coordinated attack with Sea Devil, Redfish heavily damaged the aircraft carrier Hayataka; ten days later she sank the newly built carrier Unryo.
- When Robalo was sunk, presumably by a mine, on 26 July 1944, five of her crew swam ashore and were captured by Japanese military police and jailed for guerrilla activity. They were evacuated by a Jap destroyer on 15 August and never heard from again.
- On 27 Oct. 1944 Rock fired 9 torpedoes at Darter, stranded on Bombay Shoal. In Feb. 1943 Tautog (Sieglaff) laid mines off Balikpapan, Borneo. In April 1944, the Japanese destroyer Amagiri struck one of these mines and sank. This was the same destroyer which rammed the PT-109, commanded by J.F. Kennedy.
- The first boat to be equipped with QLA sonar for locating mines, was Tinoso.
- When Admiral Nimitz assumed command of the Pacific Fleet in Jan. 1942, he raised his flag on the submarine Grayling. Relinquishing command nearly four years later, he lowered his flag on the submarine Menhaden.
- America's first Japanese POW was Sub-Lieutenant Sakamaki, captured when his midget submarine, launched from the I-18, struck a reef in Kaneohe Bay and he swam ashore and surrendered.

**Return To:**

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**NO NOVEMBER MEETING**

Next Meeting Dec. 10, 2011

12 noon

Dillon's Restaurant at Arrowhead

20585 N. 59th Avenue

Glendale, AZ 85308-6821